




Safety and Cost Analysis of a 1000 MWe Sodium
Cooled Fast Power R eactor
KFK 398
D. Smidt, W. Frisch, P. Giordano, G. Heusener, G. Kessler,





Safety and Cost Analysis of a 1000 MWe Sodium












This paper has been prepared within the framework of the association
EURATOM Gesellschaft für Kernforschung mbh. in the field of fast
breeder development.
x) EURATOM,Brussels, delegated to the Karlsruhe Fast Reactor Project
Gesellschaft für Kernforschung mbH,Karlsruhe
Conference on Safety, Fuels and Core Design
in Large Fast Power Reactors
Argonne, Illinois
October 11-14, 1965
Safety and Cost Analysis of a 1000 MWe Sodium











Institute for Reactor Development
Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe ++)
+) EURATOM, Brussels, delegated to the Karlsruhe Fast Reactor Project
++) This paper has been prepared within the framework of the association
EURATOM-Gesellschaft für Kernforschung mbH. in the field of fast
breeder development.
- 1 -
At the end of 1964 the Karlsruhe group has completed a design study of
a 1000 MWe sodium-cooled fast breeder reactor /-1 7. Now on this a
detailed safety and cost analysis has been made. This allows for a
good judgement of the safety of large fast reactors in general and for
defining the criteria of a second design of a large plant and of the
smaller prototype reactor as weIl. A number of interesting conclusions
can be drawn.
1. Main Features of the Present 1000 MWe - Design
Table 1 shows some of the important design parameters of the core.
The main features are plain cylindrical shape, oxide fuel of 87 0/0
theoretical density, no moderator like BeO and a moderate flattening
with H/D = 1/3. This results in a relatively large negative Doppler-
coefficient and an internal breeding ratio close to one.
The void coefficient then will be somewhat larger than in several
other designs. Its effect on overall safety will be one of the
topics of this paper.
The coolant volume fraction is with 50 % relatively large, this
results in a small pressure drop and pump size.Special spacers with
a small amount of structural materials can be used.
The decision not to use BeO or similar moderators, is purely econo-
mical. The loss in total breeding gain is evident, whereas the small
internal breeding ratio contributes some additional operational
difficulties.
The core has 2 zones of equal volume and different enrichment. The
229 subassemblies are of hexagonal shape, the inner radial blanket
is of oxide, the outer one of metal. The axial blanket is 40 cm
on either side. A fission gas plenum of 80 cm is below the core.
In another paper during this conference !-5_7 we shall give an
evaluation of the vented fuel concept.
The characteristics of the plant design will be discussed in detail
in our panel paper. So we only mention some important items:
-2-
- 2 -
The primary circuit is of the loop type with some features of the
pool type (mainly rigid connection ducts between reactor vessel and
heat exchangers, pumps and heat exchangers are sliding).
There are two intennediate heat exchangers and four pumps, and four
secondary loops. A new type of refueling system has been proposed.
The capital costs, based on studies from industry, have been calcu-
lated to be 115 $/kW.
2. Influence of Group Constants
The effect of the used cross section set on the calculated breeding
ratio, Doppler-effect and void-coefficient defines the reliability
of any safety and cost analysis. The results of a world-wide compa-
rison and their interpretation have been presented by Dr.Okrent
this morning. We also have calculated our specific reactor with
three sets of cross sections:
a) The russian 26-group set ASN
b) A 60-group set
c) The new Karlsruhe 26-group set
(of J.J.Schmidt and coworkers)
Table 2 shows the results.
3. Pynamics and Safety of the Reference Reactor
The dynamic behaviour of our proposed reactor has been studied
with the use of 3 programs. These are:
a) An analog program of the core.
It included for the simulation:
1) Space independent neutron kinetics
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2) Fuel heat generation and transfer through fuel and can and
heat removal by the coolant
3) Reactivity feedback caused by Doppler-effect, structural
material and coolant.
The fuel element was divided in 30 segments. For each segment
the heat balance equation was set up, density, specific heat
and thermal conductivity was considered to be constant.
Fuel melting and the temperature dependence cf Doppler-coeffi-
cient and a temperature dependent heat transfer coefficient
between fuel and can was included.
b) An analog program of the total primary circuit. It included:
1) Similar to the first program, neutron kinetics,heat generation,
transfer and removal and the reactivity feedback
(15 segments division of the fuel element)
2) The heat exchange in the intermediate-heat-exchanger
(16 segments division)
3) The flow coast-down in the main coolant pumps
4) The time delay of the pipes between reactor and heat exchanger
5) The mixing process in the reactor inlet and outlet plenum.
c) A revised version of the digital code FORE, developed by GE.
The Karlsruhe version included in addition the temperature
dependence of the heat transfer coefficient between fuel and can.
It is impossible to define one general safety criterium for a fast
reactor. At a former occasion [2] we have already pointed out,
that one has to study each possible ~~~~~! accident or incident




is always some uncertainty whether one knows each possible ~~~~~
cause of an accident it is nevertheless helpful to study the general
behaviour of a system under enforced conditions, such as fast reac-
tivity ramps of infinite height, even if the results are not direct-
ly applicable to areal case.
So the first general safety criterium is the time t between them
beginning of an infinite reactivity ramp input and the starting of
melting of the hottest fuel. It gives a scale for the possibility
of any counteractions by the scram system.
Since any reactivity input above 0.25 $ will lead to fuel melting
and under certain conditions after sufficient time to destruction
of the reactor, the reaction of the safety system should be included
into the analysis. So our ~~~~~~ safety criterium gives the ~~~~~
rate of the :~~~~~~~~~_:~E' which can be counteracted by the safety
system without starting fuel-melting. We choose a conventional,
spring-driven system with 10 safety rods.
Fig. 1 shows the space-time relationship including the specific
effects of inertia and friction. Naturally this criterium is less
general, since it depends on a specific safety system, but it is
also more practical.
Also the delay timeL between the onset of the excursion and the
beginning of rod movement has to be taken into account.
A ~~~:~_~:~~~:~~ should be the maximum hypothetical accident (MHA)
and its consequences. But this does not depend on the core design
only but also on the containment and shielding properties and is
even less general. So the MHA will not be discussed in this chapter.
Some remarks will be made in chapter 6.
Results with Safety Criterium I, Time t to Reach Start ofm
~~~-~~~~~~~------------------------------------------- ---
In table 3 the input data of the dynamic calculation of the reference
reactor are given. In fig. 2 t is plotted as a function of them
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Doppler coefficient and the structural expansion coefficient. The
influence of the Doppler effect is distinct, but not too important.
The structural coefficient acts only for slow ramp rates.
In this connection it is interesting to compare t with t b ' them c
time to reach coolant boiling (at channel exit) and t bf , the time
to reach fuel boiling. t bf may be an equivalent for the core
decomposition and termination of the excursion.
In fig. 3 the three time intervals are plotted as a function of
the ramp rate. For large ramp rates always t bc / t bf > t m•
This is equivalent to the fact that it is impossible in a highly
rated oxide core to get coolant boiling before reactor decomposi-
tion. The results of Okrent, Cohen and Loewenstein indicate the
same i-3_7. Only for small r s is tbC< t bf • Then coolant boiling
may happen. In connection with safety criterium 2 we shall prove
that these slow ramp disturbances can easily be governed by the
safety system.
Fig. 4 shows the effect of finite ramps. t is plotted as a function
m
of the ramp height for different ramp rates. For t ~ ~ allm
curves converge to the same value of r h = 0.25 $, which is defined
by static conditions. For this reactivity input the reactor does
not need any safety system.
Fig. 6 shows the maximum ramp rate, which can be counteracted
without fuel melting by the safety system as a function of the delay
time ~before beginning of rod movement for different Doppler coeffi-
cients. The safety system consists of 10 scram rods, each with a
250 kp spring and a weight of 100 kg. The total reactivity value of
cm
the rods is 15 $.




In fig. 7 is plotted the maximum ramp rate which can be controlled
by the above safety system without fuel melting for a delay time
of 30 msec as a function of the Doppler coefficient. If we also
transfer some of the information of fig. 3 to here# we get the
dotted line. It resembles the ramp rate# for which tbc = t bf •
For ramp rates above this dotted curve the reactor disassembles
before the coolant can boil. The ramp rates for coolant boiling
are below the ramp rates# which can be governed by the safety
system.
With respect to coolant boiling and void effect# therefore, it is
an important fact. that it is impossible to generate sod1um boiling
by any ramp reactivity input as long. as the normal. conventional
safety system is working. It 1s much easier to destroy the reactor
by fuel boiling.
Moreover# in principle the safety action can be accelerated by
an additional electromagnetic force accord1ng to a proposal of
Dosch i-4_7.
Necessarily the values of fuel conductivity# melting temperature.
and gap conductivity after some irradiation are not too weIl known.
To resemble the influence of these uncertainties we have calcula-
ted the allowable ramp rate as a function of T for different values
of the assured fuel melting temperature. This is shown in fig. 5.
3.5 Actual Accidents
So far we have studied the effect of hypothetical ramp excursions.
The actual ramps# i.e. control rod runaways, will definitely be
kept in the order of 0.01 $/sec and below.
Another actual possibility is the !~~~~~~_~~~~~~~~. The central
fuel element with 0.7 $ is dropped into the cold critical reactor
in 500 msec. The effect of the resulting perturbation is shown in
fig. 8. All temperatures can be kept below dangerous values.
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In fig. 9 can be seen the result of a simultaneous failure of all
4 primary pumps. The canning temperature will reach the boiling
point of sodium of about 9600 c after 90 sec.
As is shown in fig. 10, the structural expansion coefficient will
reduce the reactor power to about 75 % during this time. The
effect of the uncertainty in this coefficient can also be seen
from this figure.
It can be expected that a reactor system with a fast negative and
a slow positive coefficient will be stable in most cases. This
has been proved by a detailed analysis. According to the Nyquist-
diagram instability may occur if the Doppler coefficient is smaller
than 1/50 of its actual value or if the coolant coefficient is
50 times its actual value.
It has been shown that instability may arise also from higher
order delay terms. But there is no reason to assume those.
4. Parametric Studies, Influence on Cost and Safety
It has been the central point of our analysis to define the in-
fluence of the important design parameters on cost and safety
and by this to learn, where our conception has to be changed. So
we made systematically small displacements on many values and
calculated the effect on safety and costs. Table 4 gives a review




The d1fference to a number of other parametr1c surveys 1s that all
displacements are executed on a real system. Therefore many detailed
effects are included wh1ch are nevertheless of an extraordinary
importance. Example: If the coolant fraction a is lowered (case 1),
the pressure drop rises and, therefore, more structural material
is needed. Moreover, other types of spacers may be needed for geo-
metrical reasons.
Also, for a real system w1th g1ven heat exchangers, temperatures,
pressures etc. the effect of parametric variations on fuel and capi-
tal costs will be more realistic.
For the investigations the following programs were used:
1) One-dimensional multigroup-diffusion program "MGP" [12J
2) T\-'m-dimensional diffusion program "Twenty Grand" [13J
3) Nuclear program system Karlsruhe "NUSYS" [not pUblished]
4) Two-dimensional perturbation Code "2 D-Pert" [14J
The enrichment of the first and second core zone was determinated
by one-dimensional diffusions-calculations ("MGP") with the
26 KFK-group set [15J • From these results were generated the
macroscopic 6 group-cross sections by "NUSYS". Then the breeding
ratios, critical masses, reactivity-coefficients and power dis-
tributions were calculated by the "Twenty Grand" and the two-
dimensional perturbation code "2 D-Pert". For the calculation of
the Doppler-coeffioient the one-dimensional perturbation code
contained in "NUSYS" was used.
The determination of the core region in which removal of the sodium
caused the maximum ~ K d 1 -effect, was performed by two -so - oss
dimensional perturbation calculations. The 4 K d 1 -effectso - oss




4.2 Discussion of Nuclear Results
In table 5 the main results are given.
In fig. 11a the most important results of the nuclear calculation
are also represented graphically.
Case 1:
The reduction of the coolant fraction a from 50 to 40 % should
result in a larger internal breeding ratio. However, the coolant
pressure drop is raised to 13.7 atm and the larger requirement in
structural material cancels the gain in the internal and total
breeding ratios.
Case 1 a:
IfÄ~ is raised to 2000 C and a changed in such a way, that the
pressure drop is the same as for the reference reactor, the inter-
nal and total ER are somewhat higher. The Doppler coefficient stays
practically unchanged during these variations, whereas the void
effect is somewhat reduced for the smaller values of a.
The larger~"also allows for a smaller effective temperature
difference between the primary and secondary sodium circuit and
reduces the danger of thermal shocks in the case of a break in the
intermediate heat exchanger (IRE).
On the other side the IRE must be larger or the thermal plant effi-
ciency will be reduced. This will be discussed in our cost conside-
rations.
Case 2:
Smaller H/D must be paid far in the internal breeding ratio and
Doppler coefficient. The reduction of the void effect is favorable
compared with the reference reactor, but does not pay in comparison
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with the versions 1 and 1 a.
Gase 3:
By addition of 5 % BeO the Doppler is nearly doubled, whereas the
void effect is reduced by about 1 $. The penalty is purely economical.
The advantages are not too important for the operational stability
and safety, but for the consequences of the maximum hypothetical
accident.
Gase 4:
The addition of molybdenum for a better fuel conductivity is plainly
disadvantageous. The ER is low, the Doppler is low and the void
effect is high.
Gase 5 a:
The first version of the carbide core has the very large internal
and total breeding ratios, a Doppler coefficient nearly as large as
the oxide cores, but a tremendous void effect. The advantage of the
low fuel temperature will be discussed in connection with the dynamic
behaviour.
Gase 5 b:
Here the breed1ng is strongly reduced, especially internally. The
Doppler effect is smaller, but this is true also for the void effect.
Gase 6:
The main advantage of the vented fuel concept 1s the low amount of
canning material with the subsequent gain in breeding. It might still
be possible that strong gas pressures develop during certain trans-
ients and that the canning has to withstand them. This might change
the evaluation of the vented fuel.
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In table 6 and fig. 11 b the results of the comparative cost calcu-
lation are given. All calculations are based on the same assumptions
as for the reference reactor [1 ) •
The main changes of capital costs result from the calculated pressure
drop and the corresponding pump size. A relatively moderate power
law with an exponent 0.6 has been assumed for the cost dependence
on pumping power. Other main cost variations come from the fuel and
the breeding ratio. These values are capitalized over 15 years for
a load factor of 0.8.
Case 1:
Additional costs mainly from pumping power.
Case 1 a:
Cost savings mainly because of better ER.
Case 2:
Savings in pump size are more than compensated by fuel costs
(large number of fuel rods).
Case 3:
SomeHhat larger capital costs (pressure drop) and much larger fuel
costs (breeding). Additional costs of nearly 5 % of the total
plant costs.
Case 4:
Additional costs mainly by bad breeding.
Case 5 a:




Even with some additional capital costs for pumping power and less
ER than 5a the total net savings are largest (5 % of total plant).
This results mainly from lower fuel costs because much less fuel is
needed.
Case 6:
Savings in pumping power and ER are partially compensated by gas
- - 0purification plant (see i 5_/). Savings in the order of 2 /0 of
total costs.
Considerable differences in the dynamic behaviour compared to the
reference reactor are found only, if other fuels are used. As can
be expected moderate changes in coolant temperature and geometry
are of minor importance.
In fig. 12 t is shown for the cases O. 4. 5a, 5b as a function
m
of ramp rate. The two low temperature cores with molybdenum and
carbide are somewhat above the values for the reference core and
for the highly rated carbide.
Fig. 13 shows the effect of ramp height. The low temperature cores
naturally can withstand considerable reactivity inputs without any
action of the safety system.
In fig. 14 is plotted the maximum allowable ramp rate as a function
of the delay time of the safety system. The low temperature cores
allow for about 1.5 times faster ramps.
5. The Importance of Coolant Boiling
Partial or complete voiding of the total core may have two causes:
a) Loss of coolant flow
b) A slow excursion.
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Both occurences are improbable to a very high degree.
As has been shown, a) requires the simultaneous failure of all primary
pumps, of all emergency drives despite of a time reserve of about
90 sec, and of the safety system, (a break of the double wall primary
circuit is excluded).
b) requires the simultaneous runaway of several control rods and the
failure of the safety system or the runaway of a control rod and the
simultaneous failure of all independent safety rods.
It should really be discussed whether a maximum accident beyond this
is credible.
But if we assume credibility, then one of these accidents would
eertainly destroy the eore. Ramps of rates up to 100 $/sec may be
generated by coolant evaporation depending on the initial conditions.
The total energy of the excursion is strongly dependent on the
Doppler coefficient.
It is only for this type of hypothetieal aeeident, that the void
coefficient is of real importanee.
The dynamic studies have shown, that under other conditions boiling
in larger parts of the core ( 6k > 1 $ ) eannot oceur. (Boiling in
a single subassembly will be discussed later.)
However, in the light of these considerations two remarks have to be
made:
First Remark
The boiling starts at the upper end of the core channels. In this
region the void coefficient is negative. Therefore it has been said
that an overall positive void coefficient might not be too dangerous
under these conditions. This opinion is too optimistic. Because of
the large specific volume of sodium vapor a boiling channel will be
blocked very easily by the large pressure drop of the two-phase mixture.
For our reactor boiling begins at 28 % of normal eoolant flow, while
the channel is blocked already at 22 %.
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If boiling starts at all, chances are very large that a complete flow
blockage with sUbseguent complete voiding occurs.
Second Remark
Some designs aim at aAk ~ 0 for total voiding, but a positive
maximumAk. If voiding occurs according to the above mentioned
mechanism of channel blockage it will gradually spread from the
core center and at some time the maximum~k will be effective.
Therefore,ök ~ 0 for total voiding should not be mistaken for a
criterium of a qualitative nature. It might be helpful in a quan-
titative way only in so far, as the maximum Ak will also be smaller
compared to the case, where~k for total voiding is positive.
While we consider these types of boiling events to be very impro-
bable, we must look at another one as to be much more probable.
This is the blockage of a single fuel subassembly for example by
something in the sodium flow. The reactivity effect of this can be
governed easily by the temperature coefficient (for the central
subassembly it amounts to + 0.08 ~). But it might be disastrous if
the sodium superheats to a larger degree.
Experimental results on sodium superheat have been reported by seve-
ral authors i-7 , 8 , 9_7 . The bulk superheat certainly depends on
the heat flux and on the surface conditions. Superheating in the
oorder of 200 C and even more might be possible. Taking as an example
a maximum superheat of 200°C and taking into account the temperature
distribution in the coolant under reduced flow conditions (21 °/'0 of
normal flow) a superheating energy of about 70 kcal will be stored
in the upper quarter of the subassembly.
If finally the superheated liquid is flashed, everYthing depends on
the mechanism how the energy is released in space and time. We have
calculated the effect of the worst case, i.e. an instantaneous re-
lease of the whole energy and its impact on the subassembly wall by
using a one-dimensional model of Symonds and Mentel i-10_7T Then
apparently the subassembly box will be badly deformed and the neigh-
bouring subassemblies will be affected. If the combination of flow
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reduction and superheat now occurs in the neighbour assembl1es. the
damage may spread over the core like a chain-reaction.
So we concentrate an important part of our effort on three subjects:
a) Theoretical and experimental studies of the dynamies of two phase
flow and of the release of superheat in space and time. A first
step in this direction will be reported by Fischer and Häfele
[llJ during this conference.
b) There have to be developed methods to keep small the superheat
in a fast power-reactor.
c) The subassembly boxes must be designed in such a way that the
superheating energy can be dispersed at a maximum rate.
6. Some Remarks on the Maximum Hypothetical Accident
The MHA is the fast excursion with the effect of the positive void
caefficient.
There are two possibilities far the MHA:
a) The core 1s disassembled by the fastest possible reactivity input
rate (first excursion).
b) After the first excursion the molten core material gathers same-
where in the reactor containment (secand excursion).
The maximum reactivity input rate for the first excursion is caused
by voiding of the core center. This again can be caused by a slow
primary excursion or by a 10ss ef coolant flew.
The other possibility to push a fast reactivity increase into the
reactor is the core meltdown er at least a certain stage ef fuel
slumping.
The consequences af the second excursion may be influenced by the
shape of the containment.
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Both the first and seeond exeursions are strongly influeneed by the
Doppler eoeffieient. In our panel paper of this eonferenee we shall
diseuss this point in more detail. The released energy has to be
eontained in the eoncrete structure surrounding the reaetor vessel.
7. Conelusions
7.1 Aecording to our eriteria 1 and 2 our proposed 1000 MWe reaetor is
very safe.
7.2 Infinite ramps of the order of 10 $/see can be counteraeted by a
spring-driven safety systemJ much more than will actually oceur.
7.3 Coolant boiling in larger regions of the core eannot oceur as long
as the safety system is operating.
7.4 The positive void effect is of importance for the maximum hypotheti-
eal aeeident only. It oeeurs onlYJ if several independent improbable
conditions are fulfilled simultaneously.
7.5 Coolant boiling in a single subassembly may be dangerous in combi-
nation with sodium superheat.
7.6 Parametrie stud1es show advantages in cost and safety in the direet-
ion of lower eoolant fractions J larger6 ~ J and a not too eompact
carbide core. The addition of Mo to the fuel oxide proves to be
very unfavourable.
7.7 Further studies on the MHA and on sodium superheat and sodium




L-1_7 D.Smidt, A.Müller et.al.: Referenzstudie für den 1000 MWe natrium-
gekühlten schnellen Brutreaktor (Na 1), KFK 299 (1964)
L-2_7 C.P.Zaleski, D.Smidt et.al.: Studies of Large Reactors in France
and West Germany, National Topical Meeting Detroit, April 1965,ANS-100
L-3_7 D.Okrent, K.P.Cohen, W.B.Loewenstein: Some Nuclear and Safety Con-
siderations in the Design of Large Fast Power Reactors,
3rd Geneva Conference, p/267 (1964)
L-4_7 P.Dosch: Design and Experimental Evaluation of an Electromagnetic
Acceleration System for Fast Reactor Rods. Physics and Material
Problems of Reactor Control Rods, IAEA, Vienna (1964)
{-5_7 D.Smidt, W.Sommer: Application of the Vented Fuel Concept to a
Sodium Cooled Power Breeder with 1000 MWe, Argonne-Conference,Oct.1965
L-6_7 D.Smidt: Der Siedevorgang und seine Auswirkungen in grossen natrium-
gekühlten schnellen Reaktoren.
Internal Report IRE 18/65, Nuclear Research Center Karlsruhe (1965)
L-7_7 A.I.Krakoviak: Superheat Requirements with Boiling Liquid Metals,
ORNL-3605, p.310 ff (1963)
L-8_7 H.W.Hoffman, A.T.Krakoviak: Convective Boiling with Liquid Potassium,
Proc. of the 1964 Heat Transfer and Fluid Mechanics Institute,
p. 19 ff, Stanford University Press
L-9_7 H.Lurie, R.C.Noyes: Boiling Studies for Sodium Reactor Safety,
Part II, NAA-SR-9477
L-10_7 P.S.Symonds, T.J.Mentel: Impulsive Loading of Plastic Beams with




~ 11_7 M.Fischer, W.ffäfele: Shock Front Conditions in Two-Phase Flow
Including the Case of Desuperheat. Argonne-Conference, Oct. 1965
i-12_/ W.MUnzner: MGP Ein eindimensionales Multigruppen-Programm,
GFK Internal Report INR-103/64, Nuclear Research Center Karlsruhe
i-13_7 M.L.Tbbias, T.B.Fowler: The Twenty Grand Program for the Numerical
Solution of Few-Group Neutron Diffusion Equations in Two Dimensions,
ORNL-3200
i-14_7 J.M.Chaumont, J.A.Koerner: 2 D-Pert, A Two-Dimensional Perturbation
Code, ANL-6555
i-15_7 H.KUsters, M.Metzenroth: The Influence of Some Important Group




Some Design Parameters of a 1000 MWe Sodium Cooled Fast Reactor
Reference Reactor
Number of core zones 2
Max. rod power X 560 ..!Lcm
Rod diameter d 6.7 mm
Coolant fraction a 50 0/0
ß
0
structural fraction 17.3 /0
Pressure drop AP 3.2
kg
2







Internal breeding ratio BRin : 0.89
Total breeding ratio BRtot : 1.385





~ Kyoid maximum 3·07 $
6 Kyoid totalcore 1.04 $
Coolant inlet temperat. ~ 43Q
o
C
Coolant exit temperature ~ 5800 c
Maximum fuel center temp.tJ : 24120 Cmax
Mean power I.f) lO lO 66
max. power = J =J rad • J ax O.
80 cm fission gas plenum at the bottom,
229 hexagonal subassemblies
45 cm radial blanket




Calculation of a 1000 MWe-Breeder with 3 Cross-section Sets




eritical Mass [kg_7 2168 2048 2010
Internal Breeding Ratio 0.95 0.94 0.91
Doppler Coefficient -5.97 • 10-
6 8 -6 -6.58 • 10-6- .32 • 10
Ak Sodiurn Lass 0.024 0.013 0.008max



































Heat Transfer coefficient:[ ~ 0 J
cm C
Fuel ---+ Can (1450oC)






List of Parametric Variations
0) Original Reactor Expected Advantages Expected Disadvantages
1) Smaller coolant fraction a




3) 5 /0 BeO added
4) 10 % Mo in fuel
5a) UC, same geometry as
oxide







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Reactivity versus t~me of safety system
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Time t to reach fuel /,je.tin,:; versus Doppler-coefficient CLm -1)
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reactivrty ramp rate rs
Fig. 3
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Time t to reach fuel melting, time t b to reach coolantm c
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Time t to reach fuel melting versus ramp height
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Maximum allowable disturbance ramp rate r fars
different fuel melting temperature versus delay time
(Reference Reactor)
(Doppler-caefficient = 6 • lO-6;oC)
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Maximum allowable disturbance ramp rate r for differents
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Fig. 12
Time t to reach fuel melting versus disturbance
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Fig. 14
Maximum allowable disturbance ramp rate r versuss
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